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DEDICATION 
 
 
Mobieka Nakiea Lindo 
“the heights [that] great men reached and kept, were not attained by sudden flight, but they 
while their companions slept, were toiling upward in the night.” 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The current study is designed to develop a model to improve investors’ ability to 
identify firms that engage in financial statement misrepresentation by carefully analyzing 
published financial reports.  Earnings management literature indicates that financial statement 
information is not fully utilized by investors and that fundamental analysis provides useful 
information about a firm’s financial performance.  The study examines accruals and the 
components that firms commonly use to violate GAAP in order to develop a probit regression 
model as an early detector of financial misrepresentation.  The analysis consists of a matched-
paired sample of 30 U.S. fraud firms and 30 non-fraud firms extracted from the GAO and 
Compustat databases.  The results show that an investor who is comparing two firms from the 
same industry may use the lower Z score of the model and improve the chances of avoiding a 
fraud firm by at least 23%.   
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EPIGRAPH 
 
                    Graham's observations that investors pay too much for trendy, 
fashionable stocks and too little for companies that are out-of-favor, was on the 
money. . . . Why does this profitability discrepancy persist? because emotion favors the 
premium-priced stocks. They are fashionable. They are hot. They make great cocktail 
party chatter. There is an impressive and growing body of evidence demonstrating that 
investors and speculators don't necessarily learn from experience. Emotion overrides 
logic time after time.  
 
  Dreman, D. (1996).  Ben Graham was Right--Again.  
 
i
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Research Problem Statement  
Recent, well-publicized, examples of fraudulent financial reporting have rocked North 
American markets with significant loss of shareholders’ wealth and investors’ faith in those 
same markets.  The public press has pointed fingers at various players as having contributed to 
the market failures.  Boards of directors, auditors, standard setters, the SEC, and investors 
themselves have been cited for a lack of due diligence.  This project is designed to provide 
evidence by carefully analyzing financial reports as to whether investors could have determined 
that the firms were fraudulently reporting their financial position and performance.  According 
to Lynn Turner, chief accountant of the SEC (as cited in Magrath & Weld, 2002), the 
“misapplication of GAAP and stretching the rules to achieve desired targets are fraudulent 
accounting practices” (p. 50).   
 
The Research Purpose 
 The purpose of this research is to investigate selected U.S. firms that the SEC 
sanctioned for violating generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), or firms that 
voluntarily restated their financial statements due to accounting irregularities, to determine 
whether investors could have detected the financial misrepresentation of these firms prior to 
public disclosure of the SEC censure. 
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The Research Objective 
 The objective of the current study is to attempt to answer the following research 
question: Could a model improve investors’ ability to identify firms that engage in financial 
statement misrepresentation? 
 
The Importance of the Research 
Detection of financial fraud rests not only with corporate management, government 
regulators, and the accounting profession but also with investors.  Investors are responsible for 
their own investment, and for investigating investment alternatives while companies are 
responsible for maximizing shareholders’ wealth.  It is the responsibility of investors not to 
accept financial reports purely at their face value as they know that managers may stretch the 
boundaries of fair reporting to the breaking point.  According to Sloan (1996), investors 
apparently “fixate” on reported earnings.  They tend to focus on earnings multipliers such as 
price-earnings ratios, and they have ignored the effects of cash flows.  Dechow and Skinner 
(2000) argued that because of the way in which they respond to small discrepancies in earnings 
news, many investors seem to use heuristics (a simple rule of thumb indicating inability to 
process information) to determine firm value. 
 
  Many companies choose to manipulate earnings to meet or surpass market forecasts 
in order “to avoid investors’ wrath and the inevitable impact on stock price when their 
earnings targets aren’t met” (Phillips, Luehlfing, & Vallario, 2002, p. 48).  They typically 
manipulate earnings to “grow market capitalization and increase the value of stock options” 
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(Levitt, 1998, ¶ 17).  Serwer (2002) described this behavior as the cult of the shareholder, 
which started during the takeover and LBO boom of the 1980s, when corporate raiders forced 
CEOs to maximize shareholder value: 
the single biggest reason behind the recent spate of God-awful accounting has got to 
be the rise of the cult of the shareholder.  Simply put, over time so much focus has 
been placed on levitating companies' stock prices that many executives will do almost 
anything--legal or otherwise--to make it happen (¶ 11).  
 
 
 
The media and academic literature is replete with calls for investors to take ownership 
of their investment decisions.  For example, Kahn (2002) challenged investors to become 
investigative, arguing that as investigators untangle the complicated accounting at Enron, the 
investor’s own financial health depends on a good understanding of company earnings: 
The Enron collapse, the nagging questions about Tyco's accounting, the suspicion that 
many of America's most celebrated companies aren't nearly as profitable as they claim 
to be, make it imperative that you, the investor, get to the truth on earnings.  When 
figures confound and experts confuse, you need to take a deep breath and do the math 
yourself.  Can you?  Sure (¶ 13).  
 
 
This literature also discredits analysts’ lack of independence and their conflict of 
interests.  Analysts undermine their mediation role between management and the capital 
market by advising “management while at the same time evaluating their stocks” (Bing, 2002, 
p. 49). They compromise their position by owning stocks in the firms they represent and by 
talking “investors into buying all sorts of tech stocks they knew, or should have known, were 
dogs” (Norcea, 2002, ¶ 47).  Dowen and Bauman (1995); Nutt, Easterwood, and Easterwood 
(1999); Cote (2000); and Sridharan, Dickes, and Caines (2002) discovered in their studies that 
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analysts’ reports are compromised due to optimism or economic incentives.  Because analysts’ 
reports are a major source of information for both big and small investors, these inaccurate 
forecasts undermine analysts’ reputation and damage the efficient functioning of the capital 
market. 
 
To mitigate this damage, the SEC urged investors not to rely totally on the 
recommendation of analysts but to do their own research.  Nocera (2002) argued that “despite 
the constant reports of misconduct, investors can't cast all the blame for the market's troubles 
on the actions of CEOs and Wall Street analysts--much as they might like to” (¶ 6).  Yet, 
investors continue to overlook their own role in business failures that deplete their wealth, 
typically pointing fingers at accountants and auditors (Phillips et al., 2002).  
 
Auditors’ role in business failures has also attracted adverse publicity.  Since auditors 
often provide consulting services for the same firms that they audit, lack of independence and 
conflict of interests compromise the reliability of audited financial statements.  For example, 
Madura (2004) reported that “The conflict of interests for auditors became very obvious 
during the demise of Enron.  Its questionable accounting methods did not prevent Arthur 
Andersen from signing off on the audit” (p.49).  The implication is that investors should do 
their own homework instead of relying totally on audited financial statements.  
  
 Nocera (2002) noted that the efficient functioning of the capital market requires the 
cooperation of everyone.  This cooperative responsibility involves investors’ vigilance, 
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regulatory controls, the preparation of accurate analysts’ reports, and financials that are the 
lifeblood of the capital market.  Healy and Wahlen (1999) stated that earnings management 
research provides evidence of specimen firms with strong motivation to manage earnings by 
presenting fake financial statements prior to offering securities publicly.  Prior earnings 
management research tended to focus on motivational factors of earnings management 
(Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996), and the identification of the existence of earnings 
manipulation (Beneish, 1997, 1999).  The current study attempts to extend this concern by 
examining whether ordinary investors ignored information which could have reduced their 
losses or prevented them from investing in the fraud firms. 
 
The remainder of the current study is organized into five sections.  The theory base for 
the research is stated in Section II, while section III reviews the extant literature to provide a 
context for the hypothesis and a framework for testing the empirical model.  Section IV 
describes the research design and explains the sample selection procedures as well as the data 
collection.  Section V analyzes the empirical results, and Section VI concludes the paper. 
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II. THEORY BASE FOR RESEARCH 
Agency Theory 
The theoretical framework of the current study includes both agency theory and 
efficient market theory.  Agency theory states that as agents, managers act in ways that 
maximize their self-interest at cost to their principals or the owners outside the corporation, 
who lose shareholder value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The separation of ownership and 
control creates different risk preferences and divergent goals for managers and owners.  The 
consequences of this divergence are referred to as agency costs.  These costs include 
monitoring and bonding expenses incurred to prevent shirking by agents.  Additional costs 
include cheating, oversight, laziness, excessive salaries, company expansion, and diversification 
that reduce the profit of owners (Donaldson, 2002).  According to agency theory, there is a 
need for earnings management because of information asymmetry.1  However, earnings 
management is two fold: one side is consistent with the interest of shareholders, while the 
other is not.  First, earnings management is desirable when it is practised within the confines of 
GAAP to minimize contracting or political costs to the firm.  It also enables managers to 
signal inside information about future cash flows through their accounting policy choices.  For 
example, GAAP allows managers to choose different accounting treatment for the allocation 
of depreciation expense and inventory valuation.  This discretionary authority helps managers 
to fulfill their responsibility for maximizing shareholders’ wealth.  Magrath and Weld (2002) 
reported that:   
 
1  Managers and other insiders within the firm have information advantage over outsiders, called adverse selection. Managers 
may shirk their responsibility and blame poor performance on factors beyond their control, called moral hazard (Scott, 
2001). 
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Companies have long used earnings management techniques to "smooth" earnings, a 
process that is typically rewarded in the stock market. For example, a 1994 Wall Street 
Journal article detailed the many ways in which General Electric smoothed earnings, 
including the careful timing of capital gains and the use of restructuring charges and 
reserves (p. 52). 
 
 
Second, Healy and Wahlen (1999) argued that earnings mismanagement and fraudulent 
reporting occur: 
when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers (p. 368). 
 
 
The SEC’s definition quoted on page 1, which is applied to the current study, and that 
of Healy and Wahlen (1999) are consistent with the definition of the National Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (NACFE) (as cited in Dechow & Skinner, 2000).   Well-publicized 
examples of fraudulent financial reporting have been reported by the media and academic 
literature.  In his 2002 article, Sauer documented a fraudulent situation where: 
management at Midisoft Corporation falsely recognized as sales purchase orders 
obtained on an understanding that no product would be shipped until the customer 
gave further instructions.  Midisoft then shipped product to a warehouse and obtained 
false documents to make it appear that the product had been delivered to customers. 
(p. 960).   
 
In an exploratory study of this nature, Table 1 gives a reasonably good illustration of how 
earnings management progresses into fraudulent reporting (Dechow & Skinner, 2000).  
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TABLE 1     
Earnings Management Versus Fraudulent Reporting 
 
     
Accounting Choices                    
“Real” Cash 
Flow Choices 
Within GAAP   
  
 
“Conservative” Accounting
Exaggerated restructuring charges 
and asset write-offs 
 Overestimation of acquired in-
process R&D in purchase 
acquisitions  
Excessively aggressive recognition 
of provisions or reserves
Postponing 
sales  
Increasing R&D 
or advertising 
expenditures 
 
“Neutral” Earnings 
Earnings that result from the 
impartial process of operations 
 
 
 
“Aggressive” Accounting 
Bad debts provision understated 
Provisions or reserves drawn down 
in an excessively aggressive way 
Delaying R&D 
or advertising 
expenditures  
Increasing sales 
GAAP Violation   
 
“Fraudulent” accounting 
Recording false inventory 
Recording sales prematurely  
Sales invoices backdated 
 
 
              Source:  Adapted from Dechow and Skinner , 2000 
 
 
Agency literature has informed the investigation of fraudulent firms.  For example, 
Dechow et al. (1996) found that fraud is associated with weak internal governance structures.  
Using variables associated with corporate governance to proxy for agency costs, they examined 
corporate governance structures and identified some of the characteristics that are generally 
associated with earnings manipulators.  They found that the fraud firms had weak internal 
governance structure where the founder or the CEO served as a chairman of the board or the 
board of directors consisted chiefly of insiders or had no audit committee or external 
blockholder monitoring management.  This association between weak internal governance 
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structure and earnings manipulation means that investors should pay attention to signals 
pertaining to governance issues. 
 
Other empirical works on agency theory indicate that managers tend to use their 
discretionary authority to signal inside information or to manipulate earnings opportunistically.  
Since opportunistic earnings management adversely impacts the efficient functioning of the 
capital market, one of the main concerns of the current study is that managers could use their 
information advantage to deceive investors.  Thus, the current study attempts to determine the 
extent to which asymmetric information allows managers to misrepresent their financial 
operations and positions in ways that investors cannot detect.   
 
Efficient Market Theory 
Efficient market theory (EMT) or efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that the 
stock market may have weak, semi-strong, or strong forms of efficiency (Fama, 1970).  A 
semi-strong form of efficiency states that all historical data and publicly available information 
are reflected in current prices.  As new favorable or adverse information is introduced about 
the economy, industries, and companies, it is instantaneously impounded into the current 
share price.  This means that an investor cannot manipulate this information to obtain 
abnormally high returns (Scott, 2001).  Because the stock price compounds all immediate 
information, no stock is really overvalued or undervalued and trading enhanced by forecasting 
of future stock price is futile as abnormally high returns can only depend on luck (Donaldson, 
2002).   
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Because the concept of market efficiency is controversial, it has implications for 
fundamental analysis.  In fundamental analysis, financial variables are used to estimate the 
intrinsic value of a security.  This analysis makes it possible to make buy or sell 
recommendations based on whether the current market price of a security is less or greater 
than its intrinsic value (Cleary & Jones, 2000).  Evidence from EMT anomalies indicates that 
superior fundamental analysis may enable sophisticated investors to derive abnormal returns 
(Cleary & Jones, 2000).  These anomalies arise when information in the public domain can be 
used to obtain abnormal returns.  However, the proponents of EMT do not believe in the 
concept of market anomaly, claiming that investors cannot outperform the market consistently 
(Brown, 2001).  The controversy surrounding the concept of market efficiency is due to the 
fact that some researchers have produced empirical results suggesting that investors have the 
ability to earn abnormal returns (Ou & Penman, 1989; Ou, 1990; Sloan, 1996; Nutt et al., 1999; 
Abarbanell & Bushee, 1997, 1998).  These works largely assumed adherence to GAAP.  If the 
EMT is descriptive of the market, then the market price should reflect all publicly available 
information.  A finding to the contrary is anomalous to the EMT as shown in the results of the 
current study. 
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III.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The following section provides an overview of the relevant research on bankruptcy, 
fundamental analysis, and earnings management in order to give a methodological focus to the 
study. 
 
Bankruptcy Prediction Literature 
 Predicting the future profitability of a firm is central to its valuation and it is of primary 
interest to investors and stakeholders.  Prior research has verified the effectiveness of 
fundamental financial statement analysis in determining firm performance by developing 
models that segregate firms into fail and non-fail categories.  These models are beneficial to 
various stakeholders including investors, creditors, and auditors, who are susceptible to 
significant losses when companies fail abruptly (Boritz, 1991).  In their bankruptcy models, 
Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), and Ohlson (1980) used financial ratios, obtained from 
published annual financial statements, to show that business failure can be predicted with a 
high degree of accuracy one to five years prior to failure.  More recent publications have 
incorporated industry-relative data (Hill & Perry, 1996; Platt & Platt, 2002) and content 
analysis (Stiner, 2002) in predicting bankruptcy.   Ohlson (1980), in particular, found that 
current liquidity, financial structure, performance, and financial ratios could predict failure 
within a year.  In addition to financial ratios, other signals of potential business failure include 
changes in the market price of stocks (Beaver, 1968), poor earnings quality due to declining 
operating performance, and EPS (Fairfield & Whisenant, 2001).   This means that astute 
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investors, who can identify undervalued (overvalued) firms, could outperform the market by 
employing an investment strategy that buys (shorts) expected winners (losers).   
 
One limitation of bankruptcy models is that they assume adherence to GAAP.  
Therefore, extending the bankruptcy prediction models to a situation of non-adherence to 
GAAP would benefit various stakeholders including investors, creditors, and auditors, who 
sustain significant losses when businesses fail because of non-adherence to GAAP.  Such a 
model would operate as an early warning signal and enable investors to protect themselves by 
discriminating between firms that comply with GAAP vis-à-vis those firms that do not.  
 
Fundamental Analysis Literature 
 The proponents of EMT claim that published financial statement information cannot 
be used to obtain abnormal returns while advocates of market anomalies claim otherwise. 
Numerous studies provide evidence showing that financial statements provide information 
that can be used to predict firm value.  For example, investment analysis and bankruptcy 
models use financial statement ratios to predict firm value.  Similarly, early earnings-forecasting 
researchers using fundamental analysis, which includes ratio analysis, found financial statement 
information to be significant in predicting future firm performance.  Ou and Penman (1989) 
found that the market did not impound information contained in financial statement ratios on 
a timely basis nor did the market properly value qualitative information contained in annual 
reports (Ou 1990).   In a similar study, Holthausen and Larcker (1992) documented abnormal 
returns based on financial ratios, although they did not succeed in replicating the Ou and 
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Penman (1989) model.  In a subsequent study, Greig (1992) argued that abnormal returns in 
the models of both Ou and Penman (1989) and Holthausen and Larcker (1992) were a 
consequence of firm size.  Abnormal returns with a six-year duration were, however, 
documented in a later study by Stober (1992).  Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) simplified the 
methodological problems encountered in some of the prior studies by using 12 fundamental 
variables identified by analysts.  After controlling for factors such as firm size effects, they 
concluded that the fundamentals were value-relevant in relation to excess returns.  Abarbanell 
and Bushee (1997) compared the association between fundamental signals and changes in 
stock price based on nine fundamental signals developed by Lev and Thiagarajan (1993).  
Testing the relation between one-year-ahead change in earnings and five-year earnings growth, 
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) concluded that the fundamental signals and future-earnings 
changes were related.  In similar studies, Abarbanell and Bushee (1998) as well as Piotroski 
(2000) showed that fundamental signals can be used to predict future abnormal returns.  This 
means that a careful analysis of financial statements information may help investors to earn 
abnormal returns.  In addition, investors may earn abnormal returns by understanding the 
information content available from sources other than earnings.  According to Sloan (1996), if 
investors could strategically differentiate between high and low performing firms, then they 
could maximize on the market’s inability to distinguish between cash flows and accruals 
components of earnings. 
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Earnings Management Literature 
 Discretionary financial reporting is acceptable within the confines of GAAP.  This type 
of reporting enables managers to accomplish their responsibilities to stakeholders.  For 
example, managers may smooth earnings or manage earnings to maintain firm value when 
their firm’s stock price is sensitive to earnings news or dramatic reactions from the market in 
meeting or failure to meet market-based expectations (Myers & Skinner, 1999; Abarbanell & 
Lehavy, 2000; Payne & Robb, 2000; Bartova, Givolyb & Haync, 2002).  The example of 
General Electric’s earnings smoothing activities, already cited on page 7, is another case in 
point (Magrath & Weld, 2002, p. 52).  Smoothing stabilizes a firm’s earnings stream thereby 
increasing its value.  Smoothing also leads to increased accuracy in predicting future cash flows 
from which firm value is derived.  Smoothing exists because of the importance of net income 
to the investment decision making of stakeholders.  As a result, managers smooth earnings for 
various reasons including the need to meet market expectations and to prevent debt covenant 
violation.  They also smooth earnings for external reporting purposes.  For example, through 
external reporting, a firm can convey inside information concerning plans for long term 
earnings growth to its stakeholders.  This sort of reporting helps the market to esteem the firm 
as being credible, transparent, and less risky.  The market typically rewards the process of 
smoothing with higher market value and lower cost of capital.  The EMT claims that earnings 
smoothing is reflected in a firm’s stock price and that the market cannot be deceived by either 
earnings smoothing or earnings manipulation.  
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Smoothing, however, may evolve into abusive earnings management.  See Table 1 (p. 
8) for an illustration of how conservative accounting choices may deviate into GAAP non-
compliance.  As described above, smoothing earnings is not necessarily opportunistic.  
However, it becomes opportunistic when GAAP is contravened by the presentation of 
misleading financial results in an attempt to fool investors and other stakeholders.  Managers 
may contravene GAAP in various ways through activities such as (1) timing of transactions, (2) 
method of accounting allocations, (3) classifying income as operating/non-operating income.  
For example, managers may record fictitious sales and create fraudulent invoices or shipping 
documents to conceal their act from auditors.  Managers may also achieve income smoothing 
by switching methods of inventory valuation and depreciation allocation to other methods.  
But, because of disclosure requirements, this method of deception is generally ineffective.  
They may also capitalize advertising cost (instead of expensing it) when sales are down in order 
to boost the bottom line.  Another smoothing technique is to classify nonoperating income, 
like investment income, as operating income to boost declining operating income.  Myers and 
Skinner (1999), and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000) found that abusive earnings management in 
fraud firms is not transparent to investors and analysts.  As a consequence, these firms had 
more analysts following, reduced analyst’s forecast errors, less revision of analyst’s forecast, 
and less negative earnings.   The lack of transparency on the part of analysts may be attributed 
to “forecast optimism”.2  Auditors who may be expected to detect GAAP violation tend to be 
onstrained by conflict of interests (Madura, 2004) and by restrictive audit plans (Hemraj, 2003).  
 
2 Analysts tend to overreact or underreact to new information which leads to a “serial correlation of surprises.”  This means 
that bad news is accompanied by more bad news; the reciprocal also holds.   According to Abarbanell and Bushee (1997), 
“though analysts use the fundamental signals in revising their forecasts, they do not use the information in all of the signals 
efficiently” (p. 17). 
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It requires investors’ vigilance to uncover earnings management and to prevent 
managers from exploiting the information asymmetry.  Dechow, et al. (1996) noted that 
investors could estimate a firm’s value by carefully examining the signals of accruals.  Using the 
modified Jones Model (1995) to estimate discretionary accruals, they reported that accruals 
prior to AAER sanctioning were higher for the fraud firms.  Figure 1 (p.18) of their paper 
graphically described the different behavior of accruals in the fraud firms and the non-fraud 
firms.  The authors also pointed out that some earnings manipulators fraudulently overstated 
their revenue to obtain external financing at low cost or to avoid debt covenant restrictions.  
These are important factors that investors should pay attention to.   
 
Although fraudulent reporting may be carefully camouflaged, this information can be 
ferreted out by fundamental analysis.  Lee, Ingram, and Howard (1999) showed that earnings 
relative to operating cash flows were extremely high for the fraud firms in the prediscovery 
years relative to the non-fraud firms in their sample of 56 fraud cases from 1978 to 1991.  
They examined five years of data (three years of prediscovery fraud data and two years of 
postdiscovery data) to identify the period that maximizes the effect between fraud and 
accruals.  They found that earnings minus cash flows are a useful indicator of financial fraud.  
Lee et al. tested a new measure of accruals (see p. 34) as a “potential indicator of fraud rather 
than examining variables that might be correlated with accruals” (p. 764) for the purpose of 
clarifying mixed results pertaining to the importance of accruals in signaling fraud.  They used 
level variables because they were concerned about the comparative differences between the 
variables rather than changes in their value from one period to the next.  A level variable or 
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fundamental ratio is defined as the value of a certain indicator at a specific time.  A change 
variable is the difference in the level ratio from one period to the next.  The main difference 
between the current study and that of Lee et al. is that they used level variables.  Change 
variables are used in the current study because it is assumed that fraud exacerbates and its 
persistence would cause the ratio to be higher.  Three years of prediscovery fraud data are used 
to capture the distortion if fraud persists.   
  
If opportunistic earnings management can “fool” the majority of the market, then this 
creates opportunity for astute investors, who can detect earnings management, to profit from 
the market.  Detecting earnings management is, however, not easy because firms can mask 
operational problems with aggressive accounting techniques.  Once the manipulation is 
detected, these firms suffer from significant price decline, implying that a prediscovery of 
earnings manipulation could result in abnormal returns to vigilant investors.  Dechow et al., 
(1996) found that the stock price of manipulators fell by approximately 9%, their cost of 
capital increased, analysts’ following decreased, short term interest rate increased, and 
dispersion in analysts’ forecast errors increased.  Perhaps, a fundamental analysis of financial 
reports during this period of market anomaly could be advantageous.    
 
Because public corporations in the U.S. are characterized by a separation of ownership 
and control that gives rise to agency cost, information asymmetry will persist.  Since investors 
generally rely on financial information to predict firm value, the accuracy of stock prices (a 
major cause of many corporate control problems) has become a controversial issue.  Despite 
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contrary claims by the EMT advocates, mixed evidence from bankruptcy, fundamental 
analysis, and earnings management research findings indicate that the market is anomalous and 
that the use of ratio analysis can earn abnormal returns.  The bankruptcy and fundamental 
analysis literatures, however, assume that the firms are GAAP compliant.  Consequently, 
fundamental analysis, which is employed as an analytical tool in the current study, is used to 
determine whether investors could differentiate between firms that engage in fraudulent 
financial reporting and those that do not. 
 
   Hypothesis Formulation 
 The hypothesis, stated in the null, is that fraudulent reporting cannot be distinguished 
from fairly pervasive earnings management if managers deliberately attempt to hide or distort 
their inside information.  For example, if managers record fictitious sales and create false 
invoices or shipping documents, then it may be impossible for the market to uncover the 
deception.  
 
HO:  Diligent investors could not detect fraudulent accounting using fundamental financial 
       statement analysis.  
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IV.   RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The objective of this section is to design a model that investors may use to detect 
financial statement misrepresentation from publicly available information.  To avoid the 
complexity of sophisticated accruals-based models with inadequate applicability, this model is 
designed to accommodate the ordinary investor.  A matched-pair design is used in the analysis 
to simulate the investment strategy of an individual investor.  This split sample is important to 
the study in determining whether investors are negligent in detecting firms whose financial 
reporting is fraudulent.  To demonstrate the opportunities available to ordinary investors, data 
are extracted from the SEC database that is publicly accessible.   
 
Sample Selection and Description  
This section focuses on the sample selection and the matching of the fraud firms and 
the non-fraud (control) firms.  A criterion for the research sample is that the fraud firms and 
the non-fraud firms should have ten years of data prior to the first public disclosure of the 
manipulation.  Because the first year of fraud discovery varied for the firms and the maximum 
number of restatements is five years, the fifth year following or the tenth year in which no 
fraud occurred, is chosen to match all the firms.  For example, one sample firm that violated 
GAAP from 1995 to 1999 and whose infraction was discovered in the year 2000 is matched 
on financial statement data extracted from the year 1990.  The aim is to match the fraud firms 
and the non-fraud firms before the fraud firms were likely to have engaged in aggressive 
earnings management.  As a consequence, the sample contains only mature firms.   This means 
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that the difference in the current sample and that of Beneish (1997, 1999) and Lee et al. may 
impact the comparability of the results because the samples of these researchers contained a 
disproportionate of number of start-up firms. 
 
a.  Selection and Description of the Fraud Firms 
 The sample consists of 60 publicly traded U.S. firms, including 30 fraud firms and 30 
non-fraud firms.   The 30 fraud firms are randomly selected from the United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO) Financial Statement Restatement Database 2002, GAO-03-395R.  
The database contains 919 announced financial statement restatements3 for the period January 
1, 1997 through to June 30, 2002.  In some cases, the restatements are prompted by the fraud 
firms, independent auditors, or the SEC.  Irrespective of the restatement initiator, the SEC 
investigates all accounting irregularities.4  The GAO report includes only financial statement 
restatements that have material impact on a firm’s financial outcome.  In addition, the report 
includes the reasons for the restatements, the initial and subsequent announcement dates, the 
stock market where the company traded, the ticker symbol, and the source that instigated the 
restatement.  The GAO stated that its database was released to the public in response to 
numerous requests from academics and researchers, who found the database to be a useful 
resource for financial statement restatement information. 
  
 
 
3 According to the GAO, “financial statement restatement occurs when a company, either voluntarily or prompted by auditors 
or regulators, revises public financial information that was previously reported” (p. 1). 
4 The GAO defines accounting irregularity as “an instance in which a company restates its financial statements because they 
were not fairly presented in accordance with  GAAP.  This would include material errors and fraud” (p. 2). 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Selection Procedure and Industry Distribution for the Fraud Firms 
Financial statement restatements issued between 1997 and 2002 (GAO 2002 database) 919
Eliminate multiple financial statement restatements (79)
Total number of firms available 840
Total Firms
 Firms Available Research
SIC Codes Industry Distribution Available % Readjusted % Sample %
1000-1999 Mining, oil, and construction 21 2.50% 13 4.39% 1 3.33%
2000-2999 Commodity production 105 12.50% 46 15.54% 5 16.67%
3000-3999 Manufacturing 213 25.36% 87 29.39% 9 30.00%
4000-4999 Transportation and utilities 66 7.86% 31 10.47% 3 10.00%
5000-5999 Wholesale and retail trade 90 10.71% 35 11.82% 4 13.33%
6000-6999 Financial services       111 13.21% 33 11.15% 3 10.00%
7000-7999 Business and personal services  183 21.79% 41 13.85% 4 13.33%
8000-8999 Health and other services          48 5.71% 10 3.38% 1 3.33%
9000-9999 Public administration                3 0.36% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Total Firms 840 100.00% 296 100.00% 30 100.00%
Further eliminated:
firms missing from Compustat (137)
firms with incomplete informati (407)
Total sample of firms available 296
 
 
 Because of the exploratory nature of the study, only 30 fraud firms are selected from 
the GAO database for empirical analysis.  The small number of firms keeps the analysis at a 
reasonably manageable level.  The sample selection procedure and the industry classification of 
the 30 fraud firms are summarized in Table 2.  First, the total sample of 919 GAO financial 
statement restatements is imported into the Compustat database (Table 2).  Seventy-nine (79) 
financial statement restatements are eliminated because these firms made more than one 
restatement announcements.  To avoid duplicate count, only the restatement made prior to the 
first public disclosure is maintained for each firm.  Consequently, the research sample is 
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selected from 840 firms.  Second, 137 firms missing from the Compustat database are further 
eliminated.  Third, the remaining sample of 703 firms is checked in the Compustat database 
for availability of financial statement information.  Four hundred and seven (407) firms with 
incomplete financial information are further eliminated by this procedure thereby reducing the 
GAO list to 296 firms (Table 2).   This elimination is partly due to the ten years of data used to 
ensure that the fraud firms are matched to the non-fraud firms prior to income manipulation 
(see p.18).  The 296 firms are stratified into eight strata using a two-digit SIC code and the 30 
frauds firms are selected from this list.  Table 2 illustrates how the 30 firms are selected from 
each stratum based on the strata’s percentage representation of the remaining sample 
population. 
 
 The fraud firms are distributed across 64 two-digit SIC industries in the selected 
sample.  Table 2 illustrates the industry distribution of the firms.   In the “Total Firms 
Available” column, the manufacturing industries group (SIC 3000-3900) is the most prominent 
with 25% or 213 firms.  This is followed by the business and personal services industry (SIC 
7000-7900) with 21% or 183 firms.  Financial services (SIC 6000-6900) is next with 13% or 
111 firms, followed by commodity production (SIC 2000-2900) with 12% or 105 firms.  Of 
the two-digit SIC code, computers (SIC 35; part of the manufacturing sector) is the most 
prominent, followed by electrical equipment ex computer (SIC 36) in second place.  In the 
business and personal services sector, 185 firms belong to SIC 73 of which software (SIC 
7372) has 90 firms.  Dechow et al. (1996) and Beneish (1997) ranked the manufacturing 
industry, and the business and personal services industry in a similar way.   
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As shown in Table 2, the industry composition of the current research sample closely 
reflects the population from which the fraud firms are drawn (or the GAO list).  These firms 
(in the current research sample) misrepresented their financial statements during the period 
1998 to 2002.  In the “Research Sample” column, the manufacturing industry ranks first with 
30% or 9 firms, while the commodity production industry ranks second with 16% or 5 firms.  
The business and personal services industry, and the wholesale and retail trades both rank third 
with 13% or 4 firms each.  The persistency of financial institutions drops to 10% or 3 firms 
due to insufficient financial information in Compustat.     
 
In Table 3, the 840 firms reported in the GAO 2002 database are classified into nine 
groups in keeping with the GAO categories as follows: (1) revenue recognition; (2) 
restructuring, assets, or inventory; (3) cost or expense; (4) acquisitions and mergers; (5) 
securities related; (6) reclassification; (7) in-process research and development (IPR&D); (8) 
related-party transactions; (9) other.  The restatements are classified on the basis of the issue 
that incited the restatement.  The GAO assigned multiple5 reasons for GAAP violations (for 
example, a sample firm may violate GAAP on multiple issues such as improper revenue 
recognition, cost or expense, or reclassification) using the most material violations.  The first 
violation listed by the GAO was the most material violation and this classification is adopted in 
the current study.  Of the 840 firms reported in the GAO database, 38% or 321 contravened 
GAAP by inappropriately recognizing revenue, 14% or 118 by misclassifying cost or expense 
 
5 Of the 840 firms reported by the GAO database for contravening GAAP, 155 firms cited multiple GAAP violations.  For 
example, in the “Revenue recognition” category, 51 firms violated GAAP on numerous accounting issues such as improper 
revenue recognition, improper classification of accounting items, and improper recording of cost of goods sold.  Other 
violations are: “Restructuring, assets, or inventory” category: 53 firms; “Cost or expense”: 12 firms; “Related-party transaction”: 
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charges,  13% or 113 by misrepresenting restructuring, assets or inventory charges, and 11% or 
89 include other charges such as improper accounting for bad loans and loan write-offs (Table 
3).   A similar distribution is maintained throughout the research sample.  This distribution is 
consistent with the evidence from the SEC, academic research, and the media (Levitt, SEC, 
1998; Magrath & Weld, 2002; the GAO, 2002).   
 
Table 3 
Sample Description by Type of GAAP Violation, 1997 to 2002 
     
GAO GAO
Full Adjusted Research
Sample % Sample % Sample %
Revenue recognition 321 38.21% 114 38.51% 11 36.67%
Restructuring, assets, or inventory 113 13.45% 44 14.86% 4 13.33%
Cost or expense 118 14.05% 40 13.51% 3 10.00%
Acquisitions and mergers 56 6.67% 17 5.74% 0 0.00%
Securities related 51 6.07% 12 4.05% 2 6.67%
Reclassification 32 3.81% 11 3.72% 2 6.67%
IPR& D 33 3.93% 15 5.07% 2 6.67%
Related-party transactions 27 3.21% 11 3.72% 2 6.67%
Other 89 10.60% 32 10.81% 4 13.33%
840 100.00% 296 100.00% 30 100.00%
 
       Note: “Other” includes improper accounting for bad loans, loan write-offs, and other unspecified irregularities 
 
Earnings restatement should be an uncommon event but over the past 5 years, it has 
become a growing problem that investors are concerned with.  In 2002, the GAO reported a 
dramatic increase in financial statement restatements.  The current study finds a similar 
increase.  Using 1997 as a base year, the number of firms which were required to restate their 
financial statements increased by 116% or from 92 to 199 firms between 1997 and 2001.  The 
biggest single jump happened in 1999 with firms making restatements increasing from 95 to 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 firms; “Acquisitions and mergers”: 9 firms; “securities related”: 9 firms; “Reclassification”: 5 firms; “IPR&D”: 1 firm; 
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160.  Two things may account for the increase in the number of firms that were identified as 
misrepresenting their financial statements.  The first is that more firms are engaging in fraud.  
The second is that the SEC has become more vigilant and aggressive in identifying and 
sanctioning those firms that provide misleading financial statement information. 
 
b.  The Matched-pair Design 
A matched-pair sample design is selected to compare the fraud firms and the non-
fraud firms.  This research design is chosen because (1) it makes it possible to simulate the 
strategy of an individual investor, who is comparing two unknown firms from the same 
industry (and is unlikely to compare all firms in the industry).  This design also helps to (2) 
filter out the effects of the excluded variables that are not under observation in the current 
study.  Another reason is that these variables are equally likely to appear in both the fraud 
firms and the non-fraud firms.  For example, industry or size may be used as a predictor of 
fraud, and matching on them may nullify their potential effect.  Matched-pair samples are 
typically used to estimate the population difference between two groups (Kohler, 2002).  The 
matched-pair sample design is not the only acceptable approach but it is convenient and 
appropriate for the current research question.  Since the research sample is small, adding 
variables for size and industry is problematic. Yet those variables are known to impact the 
various ratios.   
 
The year in which the annual report of the fraud firm is restated for irregularities in 
prior years is designated as time t (Figure 1), and matching is done on the tenth year prior to 
 
“Other”: 5 firms. 
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this date, t-10 (see p. 18).  The financial statement variables are measured on the basis of the 
last U.S. 10-K filing released prior to restatement, t-1.    
 
Figure 1 
Matching and Research Process Timeline 
Matching the fraud firms Year fraud
with the non-fraud firms First year prior was publicized
to detection            
        
        t-10      t-5        t-1       t         Time 
Premanipulation period              Fundamental analysis
 
 
 
There are limitations associated with the type of matching technique reported in Table 
4.  Zmijewski (1984) associated the “oversampling” of distressed firms and sample selection 
bias with matching techniques that splits the data proportionately.  In a study of bankrupt 
firms, he found that selection bias and the infrequent nature of bankruptcy produced biased 
estimated coefficients, resulting in inaccurate classification and prediction error rates.  In 
addition, the design introduces nonrandom sampling because of the matching criteria 
described on p. 25.  In a subsequent study, Platt and Platt (2002) supported Zmijewski’s (1984) 
findings but found his empirical test to be weak.  They agreed that a sample size closely 
reflecting the population would solve the problem.  Consequently, it is possible that some bias 
may occur in the results of the current study because it splits the sample 50-50 between the 
fraud firms and the non-fraud firms.   
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d.  Selection of the Non-fraud Firms 
The selection of the non-fraud firms is contingent upon the classification of the fraud 
firms and the matched-pair design.  The non-fraud firms are selected from the Compustat 
database and checked against the GAO 2002 list.  These firms are not listed in the GAO 
database and they are not known to have been charged with accounting irregularities during 
the period under review.  The U.S. 10-K filings of each non-fraud firm are also checked for 
fraudulent restatement and the firms that have restated due to financial misrepresentation are 
excluded from the research sample.  
  
For each of the 30 fraud firms in the sample, a non-fraud firm that is GAAP compliant 
and with financial statements available in Compustat is identified based on the following 
criteria:  
(1) Industry - The non-fraud firm is from the same four-digit SIC industry similar to 
that of the fraud firm.  
(2) Sales and Total Assets - The non-fraud firm has sales and/or total assets similar to 
that of the fraud firm.  
(3) The selected non-fraud firm has 10 years (see p.18) of available data which 
includes the restatement years of the fraud firm.  For example, if a fraud firm 
restated in the year 2001, then data for matching should be available for the year 
1991.    
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Table 4 reports the results of the t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon Mann-
Whitney test for the means and medians which were calculated to determine whether 
significant differences exist between the samples.  The descriptive statistics and the test of 
differences (t-test and Wilcoxon) show that the fraud firms and the non-fraud firms are 
homogenous based on total assets and sales at year t-10 and size is not expected to be a factor. 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics Matching Fraud and 
Non-fraud Firms Ten Years Prior to Manipulation, 1988 to 1992 
Fraud Firms Non-fraud Firms
Test of 
Differences
Mean Mean t-test
Median Median Wilcoxon 
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation p-value*
Sales 534.567 527.291 0.976
139.841 129.021 0.929
920.777 982.688
N = 30 N = 30 N=30
Total Assets 430.427 405.301 0.895
162.621 114.664 0.836
755.095 718.928  
         Note:  *p-value = two-tailed test 
 
 
 
Data Collection 
To test the fundamental signals, data for the fraud firms and the non-fraud firms are 
extracted from two sources.  Detailed historical financial statements information for the non-
fraud firms is extracted from the Compustat 2002 database, while the U.S. 10-K filings for the 
fraud firms are extracted from the SEC’s database.  Since Compustat restates financial 
statement numbers to reflect restatement adjustments, the original U.S. 10-K information filed 
with the SEC, which is the information that investors could easily access prior to the public 
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announcement of financial statement misrepresentation, is used for the restatement years.  The 
data available to investors prior to the publication of financial statement fraud are crucial to 
answering the research question posed by the current study.   
   
 
Description of Fundamental Signals 
A set of fundamental signals or independent variables (used interchangeably) identified 
from prior research is used to model the relationship between earnings, operating cash flows, 
and accruals as indicators of financial statement misrepresentation.  The fundamental signals 
are chosen because of their popularity in both the media and academic literature.  Three years 
of data is used in the current study because it is difficult to identify a single period that 
maximizes the effect that fraud has on cash flows or earnings.  Selecting only those years in 
which the accruals variable is at its highest in the analysis would imply that the presence of 
high accruals equate to fraud.  Using periods longer than three years would mask the 
association between fraud and accruals or nullify the effect (Lee et al.).  The investor, is also 
assume to analyze at least three years of data before making an investment decision. 
 
The variables are averages of the three years preceding public disclosure of the 
financial statement misrepresentation.  The averages are used to obtain accurate ratios because 
of the variations that occur in financial data from one statement period to the next.  The ratio 
is computed for each of the three years under review and then averaged.  The use of averages 
is in keeping with Poitras, Wilkins, and Kan (2002), who used three-year averages as opposed 
to individual year because the three-year averages produced more meaningful results.   As the 
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purpose of this exploratory research is to develop a model that individual investors could use 
to detect fraud firms, the three-year averages are particularly appropriate to the study because 
investors can calculate them fairly easily.  In the case of a probit model, investors only have to 
calculate once for each firm as opposed to a firm-year observation which requires separate 
calculations for each year under review.  The use of three-year averages is expected to generate 
meaningful information on the relationship between fraud and the accruals measure.  The 
three-year averages include pre-manipulation data of 60% or 18 fraud firms that did not restate 
for the entire three consecutive years.  According to Dechow and Skinner (2000) (Table 1), 
firms with fewer than three years restatement are likely to engage in aggressive earnings 
management, which is a precursor to earnings manipulation.  Only 20% or six firms restated 
for more than three years.  Because all the misstated years for the majority of the observations 
are included in the analysis, the likelihood of observing differences between the fraud and the 
non-fraud sample is maximized.   
 
As described in Table 5, the fundamental signals developed below from prior research 
and the media are incorporated into a probit model in order to identify a set of financial 
variables that investors may use for fraud detection. The variables are reported on a firm’s 
financial statement and they are easy to compute.  This section discusses the fundamental 
signals and their predicted signs along with the descriptive and bivariate statistical tests that are 
performed prior to incorporating the financial variables into a probit model:  
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1.  Underlying Constructs 
     Proxies for earnings, cash flows, and accruals are used in deriving several of the 
independent variables employed in subsequent testing.  These key variables are defined as 
follows: 
a. EBEI - earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat #123).  This definition 
excludes non-recurring items, extraordinary items, and discontinued operations 
thereby making it a realistic measure of the level of cash flows and accruals 
(Sloan, 1996).  EBEI is the best estimate for forecasting future earnings and its 
use in the current study is consistent with prior earnings management literature 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Collins & Hribrar, 2000; Phillips, Pincus, & Rego, 2003). 
 
b. Cash Flows From Continuing Operations (CFCO) – the difference between 
cash flows from operating activities (CFO) (Compustat #308) minus cash 
flows from extraordinary items and discontinued operations (EIDO) 
(Compustat #124) included in CFO (CFO – EIDO).  EIDO is removed from 
CFO to obtain a cash flow from continuing operations and it is the same 
concept used for EBEI, since neither extraordinary items nor discontinued 
operations are indicative of future cash flows.  CFO is taken from the 
Statement of Cash Flows.  It is in keeping with the direct method, SFAS 95 
(FASB, 1987) that requires disclosure of cash from operations.  Prior to SFAS 
95, the balance sheet method was the only choice.  Recently, Collins and 
Hribrar (2000) used both the direct and the balance sheet methods to calculate 
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estimates of cash flow from operations.  They then used each measure to 
determine total accruals, after which they tested each measure of total accruals 
in the modified Jones model.  The results showed that the direct method 
provided a better estimate of total accruals and consequently discretionary 
accruals than the traditional balance sheet method.   
 
c. Total Accruals (TotAcc) - the difference between earnings before extraordinary 
items and cash flows from continuing operations (EBEI – CFCO).  In prior 
studies, total accruals are computed using the balance sheet method.  This 
method is based on the changes in the working capital balance sheet accounts 
and the accrual components of revenues and expenses on the income 
statement.  The current study makes use of the information required in the 
Statement of Cash Flows because it is found to be superior to the traditional 
method.  The direct method of calculating total accruals is as follows:   
TotAcc t = EBEIt  – CFCOt 
 
   
2.  Independent Variables 
 a.  Accruals 
Accruals, which comprise a discretionary and a nondiscretionary component, 
consist of revenues and expenses not represented by cash flows and the 
discretionary component is commonly used in earnings management to meet 
managers’ objectives (Dechow et al., 1995, 1996; Myers & Skinners, 1999; Payne & 
Robb, 2000; Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2000).  As discretionary accruals are susceptible 
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to managerial manipulation, this component is measured to detect financial 
statement misrepresentation.  Unlike normal accruals which reverse, accruals that 
are fraudulent have the tendency to perpetuate until they are discovered.  
 
Discretionary accruals are also associated with measurement errors and problems 
of data requirements.  These errors occur because discretionary accruals, which are 
unobservable, are usually estimated.  Many studies have used the Jones models 
(1991 & 1995) to estimate discretionary accruals.  They employed a long time series 
regression of total accruals on information for each firm or a cross-sectional 
regression within specific industries.  This method makes the Jones models 
complex.  Because the current study is designed to make it possible for ordinary 
investors to estimate accruals fairly easily, it is not necessary to estimate 
discretionary accruals or to segregate total accruals into its different components.  
This approach facilitates the research question and ensures accessibility of data that 
can be easily calculated by the ordinary investor.  The proxies developed for 
accruals are TAcc, daeAcc, and CPIT and they are operationalized as follows:  
 
i. Total Accruals (TAcc) - Beneish (1997, 1999) found that fraud is correlated 
with total accruals which proxy for discretionary accruals.  The fraud firms’ 
accruals are expected to be more positive or less negative than those of the 
non-fraud firms because managers can use their discretionary judgment to 
inflate earnings.  Recording fictitious sales will also affect earnings and 
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other current asset accounts.  TAcc is computed as the three-year average 
of TotAcc scaled by lagged total assets (TA) to minimize the effect of firm 
size and it is operationalized as follows:  
 
where TA =  total assets (Compustat #6) at year t-1 
 
ii. Total Accruals (daeAcc) - daeAcc is, arguably, a better approximation of 
discretionary accruals than total accruals since it excludes depreciation and 
amortization (DAE).  On average, total accruals are negative largely because of 
DAE.  Depreciation is a cost allocation and does not represent a source or use 
of future cash from operations.  While some portion of depreciation may be 
discretionary, disclosure standards make its use less likely in financial statement 
misrepresentation.  As an alternative to TAcc and analogous to Lee et al., DAE 
is added back to EBEI to model and compare the relationship between 
earnings and operating cash flows as another measure of accruals.  The 
operating performance of a firm may be discerned from this signal.  The 
second measure of accruals (daeAcc6), is computed as TotAcc plus DAE, as 
shown in the formula below:  
Accrt = (TotAcct + DAE t) 
                      
                                                 
6 Lee et al. used the balance sheet approach to calculate daeAcc while the current study uses the direct approach. 
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where DAE = depreciation and amortization (Compustat #14) at time t.  The 
three-year average of daeAcc scaled by lagged TA is operationalized as follows: 
 
 
iii. Current Portion of Income Tax (CPIT) - is an exploratory examination in 
which current income tax rates are used as a proxy for discretionary 
accruals.  Firms are unlikely to manage earnings using accruals that will 
increase the amount of tax payable.  On the other hand, firms may use 
accruals to increase taxes payable when loss carry-forward would otherwise 
be lost; this action leads to lower current tax expenses.  In addition, the 
computation of income tax provides managers with less discretion because 
it is less susceptible to manipulation.  Therefore, when cash flows are 
declining, managers may prefer to use accruals adjustments such as lower 
valuation allowances that do not affect the tax return.  Since income tax 
regulation allows less reporting discretion and relies more on realized cash 
flows, lower income tax rates signal greater use of accruals in computing 
financial statement income.  Lower income tax rates are expected for the 
fraud firms relative to the non-fraud firms.   
 
Unlike Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003), who used deferred tax expense to 
proxy for discretionary accruals, and Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills (2002),  
who used changes in tax expense to proxy for missed earnings target, the 
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current model uses the proportion of CPIT to pretax income as a proxy 
for earnings management.  CPIT is a component of total taxes reported in 
a firm’s U.S. 10-K filings with the SEC; it may also be computed as the 
difference between total taxes and deferred taxes.   This third measure of 
accruals is calculated as a three-year average of CPIT divided by the 
absolute value of PTI to smooth out differences in incentive to manage 
earnings either upward (downward) and it is operationalized as follows: 
 
where CPIT = current portion of income tax at year t 
PTI = pretax income (Compustat #17) at time t 
 
 b.  Income Smoothing 
The income smoothing literature provides two relatively new proxies for income 
smoothing (ESm1, ESm2).  They are tested as indicators of financial statement 
misrepresentation.  The measures may help investors to detect whether accruals 
are being used to smooth volatility in income in order to conceal poor firm 
performance.  Because these income smoothing measures are used as exploratory 
measures in the current study, they may function differently from the results of 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003).  The measures are computed as time series 
analysis with five years of data (starting at year t-1 to t-5) that are easily accessible 
to investors and can be computed using an Excel spreadsheet:  
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i. ESm1 - if firms engage in financial misrepresentation in order to mask 
declining performance, the standard deviation of earnings is expected to be 
small relative to the standard deviation of cash flows which cannot be 
easily smoothed artificially.  ESm1 is calculated to measure the extent to 
which components of accruals are used to smooth reported earnings.  
Because earnings smoothing reduces variability in a firm’s earnings stream, 
managers may employ earnings smoothing to signal the amount of future 
earnings that investors can anticipate or to camouflage deteriorating 
financial performance.  If managers are controlling earnings volatility, then 
the value of this measure is expected to be lower for the fraud firms.  
Similar to Leuz et al. (2003), the measure is calculated as the standard 
deviation of EBEI divided by the standard deviation of CFCO (both 
EBEI and CFCO are scaled by lagged TA) and it is operationalized as a 
three-year average as follows:   
 
 
where, σ = standard deviation 
 
ii. ESm2 – Leuz et al. stated that cash flows and earnings are negatively 
correlated even without income manipulation.  If cash is slow coming in, 
AR and payables will both increase.  If fraud is undertaken to mask failing 
performance any short-fall in cash must be off-set by income-increasing 
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accruals if earnings are to be maintained or to imply growth.  
Consequently, changes in CFCO and changes in TAcc are expected to be 
negatively correlated.  This measure is expected to reveal the extent to 
which managers misrepresent their financial performance by inflating 
reported earnings.  Highly negative correlation between changes in cash 
flows and changes in accruals would suggest more aggressive smoothing 
(Leuz et al.).  ESm2 is expected to be lower for the fraud firms.  It is 
calculated as the Spearman Rho correlation coefficient of the three-year 
average of changes in CFCO and changes in TAcc (both CFCO and TAcc 
are scaled by lagged TA) and it is operationalized as follows:     
 
     where ρ = Spearman Rho correlations 
 
     ∆ = change 
 
                           
 c. Free Cash Flow  
Free Cash Flow (Free-C) is designed to capture a firm’s ability to fund on-going 
property plant and equipment (PP&E) needs from current operations.  A fraud 
firm that capitalizes major repair expenses can improve cash from operations but 
PP&E would increase.  Consequently, this measure is expected to capture the 
impact of the fraudulent behavior on cash.  Even if some firms fail to capitalize 
expenditures in PP&E, those firms that resort to misrepresentation may be less 
likely to generate enough cash from operations to fund on-going capital equipment 
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needs.  In this case, a signal indicating higher Free-C is expected to reduce the 
probability of fraud.  On the other hand, as the requirement for external financing 
increases with highly negative Free-C, these firms may be motivated to 
misrepresent their financial statement information (Dechow et al, 1996).  Because 
they are financially strapped, if the firms are not actively replacing operating assets 
or selling assets to fund current operations during the misstatement period, then 
the results for Free-C may not be strong.  While Dechow et al. (1996) measured 
average capital expenditure (CAPX) prior to manipulation, in the current study the 
measurement of CAPX includes the manipulation years.   
 
CAPX is defined as investment in PP&E reported under investing activities on the 
statement of cash flows.  Average CAPX is used since CAPX is lumpy across time.  
Free-C is expected to be lower for the fraud firms relative to the non-fraud firms 
but the result may differ from that of Dechow et al. (1996).  The measure is 
computed as the difference between CFCO and average CAPX over three years 
scaled by lagged current assets7 (CA) and it is operationalized as follows:   
 
where PP&E = net property, plant and equipment  
CAPX = capital expenditure (Compustat #128) 
CA = current assets (Compustat #4)         
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      d. Change Variables 
This section examines change variables in relation to revenue fraud and other 
specific measures that the media and academics believe that firms use to violate 
GAAP.  The measures are expected to convey crucial information about a firm’s 
fundamentals and may be useful early warning signals about a firm’s performance.   
Change variables are incorporated in the current study because of the assumption 
that fraud exacerbates.  They are applied in accordance with Beneish (1997, 1999).  
The assumption is that because fraud exacerbates the change variables of the fraud 
firms will be higher on average than those of the non-fraud firms; otherwise there 
may be no difference.  When the fraudulent activity is a nonrecurring event or does 
not evolve overtime or if it is corrected in the next year, then the ratio itself may be 
higher but the change may be lower.  These variables are components of accruals 
and are used to capture recurring financial statement fraud:     
i. Days Sales in Receivables Index (DSRI) -   significant imbalances between 
changes in accounts receivable relative to sales are usually associated with 
fraudulently activities.  Academics and the media have cited revenue 
inflation as the most prevalent reason for restatement (Dechow et al., 
1996; Beneish 1997; Palmrose, & Scholz, 2000; Palmrose, Richardson, & 
Scholz, 2001; Magrath & Weld, 2002).  The GAO also reported that 38% 
or 321 firms in its study (Table 3) falsified revenue, while 33% or 306 firms 
reported by the Financial Executive Institute (FEI) falsified revenue during 
 
7 In keeping with Dechow et al. (1996), Free-C is scaled by CA to control for differences in the magnitude of CA which 
represents the readily available funds to the firm such as short-term investments or cash. 
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the period 1977 to 2000.  Because revenue is frequently overstated by 
manipulating sales, examining its relationship to accounts receivable (AR) 
is crucial to the current study.  Since AR is directly affected by revenue, 
one way to examine this relationship is to determine whether changes in 
AR are in line with changes in sales (Compustat # 12), as shown in the 
formula below.  Because accruals for fraudulent sales are not accompanied 
by increased cash flows in the future (as accruals perpetuate until 
discovered in these cases), AR relative to sales accelerates.  For example, 
unscrupulous managers may book nonexistent sales to inflate revenue so 
that earnings targets can be met.  Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham 
(1989) reported that 14% of the fraud firms in their sample used AR 
account to misstate their financial statement.  A material increase in the 
ratio indicates that a firm's AR may be overstated (Beneish 1997, 1999).  
On the other hand, substantial increases in AR relative to sales may be 
attributed to the firm’s difficulties in collecting its AR.  The firms may also 
have adopted a more liberal credit policy.    
 
DSRI is expected to be positive and significantly higher for the fraud firms 
than for the non-fraud firms.  The results may, however, differ from those 
of Beneish (1997, 1999), whose computation is derived from the first year 
of misrepresentation.  While Beneish (1997, 1999) captured distortion in 
DSRI using a single year of misrepresentation, over a three-year period this 
Financial Statement Misrepresentation:  Could Investors Detect It? 
 
 42 
distortion may not be captured if the fraud does not perpetuate or if it is a 
single event of insignificant magnitude.  The three-year average of change 
in the ratio of AR to sales at year t to the corresponding change in the ratio 
AR to sales at year t-1 and it is operationalized as follows:   
 
where AR = accounts receivable (Compustat # 2) at time t. 
    
ii. Inventory (INV) - inventory is another common method used to 
misrepresent earnings.  For example, managers may book nonexistent INV 
or deliberately overvalue inventory thereby magnifying fraud because 
accruals do not reverse in these situations.  According to Loebbecke et al. 
(1989), INV accounted for 22% of the fraud firms in their sample.  In 
order to determine whether inventory and sales are out-of balance, their 
relationship is examined in the current study.  The ratio is expected to be 
positive and significantly higher for the fraud firms than for the non-fraud 
firms if fraud perpetuates, and it is of significant magnitude over the three-
year period.  This computation is a three-year average of the ratio changes 
in INV to sales at year t to the corresponding ratio changes in INV to sales 
in year t-1 and it is operationalized as follows:   
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         where INV = inventory (Compustat #3) at time t. 
 
iii. Sales Growth Index (SGI) - when stock price reduces significantly because 
market expectations are not met, high growth firms are more inclined to 
violate GAAP in order to dissipate the impression that their growth is 
deteriorating (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2000; Payne & Robb, 2000; Bartova et 
al., 2002).  Though rapid growth is not necessarily due to fraudulent 
activities, it is a strong motivation for fraud because it pressures managers 
to maintain their financial position “in a market that is unforgiving of 
companies that miss their estimates” (Levitt, 1998, p. 3).  In their 1989 
study, Loebbecke et al. found that high growth firms accounted for 29% of 
their sample of fraud firms.  Beneish (1997, 1999) also found that high 
growth is positively related to manipulation.  Similarly, findings of high 
sales growth in the current study would be appropriately construed as an 
indicator of fraud.  If a fraud firm is attempting to maintain a certain level 
of sales growth, then continuous recording of the fraudulent sales will 
cause the change ratio to become larger each year the fraud exacerbates.  
On the other hand, if the fraud is a one-time event then the change ratio 
will not become disproportionately larger each year; instead it may become 
lower.  The results of the current study would, however, be different from 
those of Loebbecke et al. as well as from those of Beneish (1997, 1999) 
because the fraud samples of these researchers contain a large number of 
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start-up firms that frequently exhibit high growth, while the current study 
sampled only mature firms.  The sales growth ratio is predicted to be 
higher and positive for the fraud firms relative to the non-fraud firms if the 
rapid growth results from fraud.  Averaged sales growth over the three-
year period covered by the current study is measured as sales in year t 
divided by sales at t-1 and it is operationalized as follows: 
 
 
ii. Asset Quality Index (AQI) – in keeping with Beneish (1997, 1999), this 
construct measures changes in the risk of asset realization.  A high ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets suggests an asset structure of high 
realization risk (Siegel, 1991).  AQI calculates that portion of total assets 
from which future benefits are more uncertain.  If significant changes in 
capitalized intangibles are attributed to capitalization rather than expenses, 
then it may mean that net income is being deprived of proper charges 
(Siegel, 1991). Consequently, higher values are expected to increase the 
probability that a firm has engaged in income manipulation.  Firms that 
capitalize deferred charges such as advertising will have a higher AQI than 
firms that invest in tangible assets.  According to Beneish (1999), AQI will 
be higher than one as a firm increasingly defers cost.  Beneish (1999) also 
noted that since manipulators rarely engage in acquisition increases, the 
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increase in the index is not likely to be due to goodwill arising from 
mergers.  Therefore, if a firm fraudulently capitalizes deferred charges over 
time to inflate revenue, then the AQI of the fraud firms is expected to be 
higher relative to the AQI of the non-fraud firms.  The index is computed 
as the change in the ratio CA plus net PP&E over TA at year t to the 
corresponding ratio CA plus PP&E (Compustat #8) over TA at year t-1 
and it is operationalized as follows:   
 
 
iii. Leverage (LEV) - the debt8-to-asset ratio change variable measures the 
amount of debt that a firm employs to finance its projects and programs.  
This ratio depicts the financial structure as reflected by a measure of LEV.  
A relatively large amount of debt in a firm’s capital structure reduces its 
ability to finance new projects and progressive programs relative to the 
firms with lower debt-to-asset ratios.  This suggests that the propensity to 
violate GAAP increases with a high debt ratio.  LEV is expected to be 
higher for fraud firms that expanded their use of accounts payable in order 
to finance continuing operations.  Consequently, higher changes in LEV 
are expected to be an indicator of manipulation.  Therefore, the leverage 
                                                 
8 Total debt is both long- and short-term debt obligations.  This ratio can be calculated in two ways. (1) It can be calculated as 
total debt (current liabilities plus long term debt) divided by total assets.  This signifies the use of significant amount of short-
term debt on a regular basis (for permanent finance). (2) It can be calculated as total debt (total debt or long-term debt) to 
signify the use of small amount of short-term debt, or the use of short-term debt on a seasonal basis by some companies. 
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ratio should be higher for the fraud firms than for the non-fraud firms.  
Dechow et al. (1996) and Beneish (1997, 1999) used this measure in the 
first year of the misstatement and the previous premanipulation year, while 
the current study uses three years of misstatement preceding the fraud 
discovery.  This computation is a three-year average of the ratio change in 
CL plus LTD over TA at year t to the corresponding ratio change in CL 
plus LTD over TA at year t-1 and it is operationalized as follows:   
 
      where CL = current liabilities (Compustat #5);  
      LTD = long term debt (LTD) (Compustat #9) 
 
 Table 5 delineates the computation of the fundamental signals that are adopted in the 
current study.  It also provides the definitions of the constructs and their acronyms, the 
predicted signs for each variable and the authors who had used them. 
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TABLE 5 
Fundamental Signals 
Note:  The variables are averages of the three years prior to public discovery of the manipulation.  ρ=Spearman Rho 
correlation; ∈= change 
Construct Acronym Computation   Predicted  Sign Applied By 
Total Accruals 
 
TAcc 
 
 
 
daeAcc 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
Collins and 
Hribrar, 
2000 
 
Lee et al., 
1999 
 
Current Tax Rate CPIT - Exploratory 
Income 
Smoothing 
 
ESm1 
 
 
ESm2 
 
     
- 
 
- 
Leuz et al., 
2003 
 
Free Cash Flow Free-C - Dechow et al., 1996 
Change Variables:    
Days Sales in 
Accounts 
Receivable 
DSRI + Beneish, 1997, 1999 
Days in Inventory INV + Beneish, 1997, 1999 
Sales Growth 
Index SGI + 
Beneish, 
1997, 1999 
Asset Quality 
Index AQI + 
Beneish, 
1997, 1999 
Leverage LEV + Beneish, 1997, 1999 
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Statistical Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics are computed for each sample firm to determine whether the 
means and medians of the independent variables for the fraud firms and the non-fraud firms 
are different (Table 5).  Next, the t-test and the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test are used to 
assess differences in the means and medians of the two groups, respectively.  The statistics 
determine whether the distributions are consistent with the samples being drawn from the 
same population.  The p-value represents the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis that 
no difference exists between the samples when the null is in fact true.  Subsequently, a 
correlation matrix for continuous variables is examined to identify variables that are highly 
correlated. 
 
 The probit regression model is then used to distinguish the fraud firms from the non-
fraud firms.    The equation for the model is described below where F, the dichotomous 
dummy dependent variable, represents one for the probability of fraud and zero otherwise.  
The constant (intercept) or parameter (slope coefficient) to be estimated on the explanatory 
(independent) variables is β0 or β1, respectively.   X is the matrix of the explanatory variables, 
and the subscript i represents the firm being analyzed.  The slope coefficient (β1) indicates the 
effect of a unit change in X on the function of the probability of F and ε represents the error 
term: 
  Fi = β0 + β1Xi + ε 
The probit model is appropriate for the nonmetric dichotomous dependent variable 
fraud.  As a nonlinear model, probit makes it possible to estimate models with dichotomous 
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dependent variables.  A dichotomous dependent variable violates the assumptions of 
normality, resulting in misleading OLS9 estimates (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998; 
Freund & Wilson, 2003).  OLS is, therefore, not optimal for the current study.  Another 
problem of OLS is that the estimated value of the dependent variable can occur outside the 
range of 0 and 1.  The cumulative normal distribution attributes of probit constrain the 
predicted value of the dependent variable within the range 0, 1.  Probit and logit are similar, 
except that logit uses the cumulative logistic function while probit uses the cumulative normal 
distribution.  The left hand side of probit (in this case F) can be considered as a Z score.10  
Therefore, a unit change in X yields a β unit change in the cumulative normal probability (or Z 
score) that F falls into a specific category.  Although logit has more diagnostic tools than 
probit for analyzing data, both the logit and the probit regression reach the same statistical 
conclusion and using either of them is a matter of personal preference. 
 
The effectiveness of the probit regression model is tested with a cross-validation 
sample.  The test is computed by using one part of the data to build a model (the estimation 
sample) in order to estimate the coefficients.   The result of the estimation sample is then 
applied to the other part of the data (validation or holdout sample) to predict the dependent 
variable values for the rest of the sample.  The single cross-validation method is not the only 
approach used for cross-validation; it is used in the current study because of its popularity and 
 
9 OLS means Ordinary Least Squares. It is the technique used to calculate the regression equation that minimizes the sum of  
   the squares of the error terms.  In other words, it is the difference between the observed values and the predicted values for   
   the dependent variable (Wright, 1998). 
10 A Z score is a statistical measure of the distance a data point is from the population mean. It is calculated as: Z=x-Φ/σ                                            
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convenience.   As high multicollinearity11 makes sample-to-sample regression coefficients 
unstable, the cross-validation is performed because it helps to determine the stability of the 
coefficients across different test models as well as the model’s predictive accuracy.   
 
According to Steckel and Vanhonacker (1993), who developed a formal test for the 
cross-validation of regression models using the simple random-splitting framework, splitting 
the data into halves is suboptimal in small samples.  They recommended that more 
observations should be used for the estimation sample than for the validation or holdout 
sample and that for moderate samples (20 < <100), one-quarter to one-third validation 
provides a higher power.  On the basis of this recommendation, the total sample of 60 firms is 
split into two in the current study.  One subsample consisting of 40 firms (20 matched pairs) is 
used to estimate the model while the second subsample consisting of 20 firms (10 matched 
pairs) is used to estimate the model’s predictive accuracy.  The coefficients from the estimation 
sample are used to test the sensitivity of the probit model across different test models.  The 
holdout sample tests the classificatory power of the model to determine its effectiveness as an 
indicator of the probability of fraud. 
                                                 
11 Multicollinearity is defined as the extent to which any variable effect can be accounted for by other variables in the 
analysis (Hair et al.).  It may cause the predictor variables to display high correlations among themselves. This condition 
distorts the value of the estimated regression coefficients, inflates the standard error of beta, and thus makes it more 
difficult to determine which predictor variable is having an effect.  Multicollinearity may also be attributed to a small 
sample size; its occurrence in variables may compromise the robustness of a model (Leahy, 2000). 
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V.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This section reports the statistical results of a sample of the fraud firms and the non-
fraud firms that have not misrepresented their financial statements.  First, it reports the 
descriptive statistics and comparisons of the sample along with the correlation matrix.  Second, 
it discusses the stepwise selection procedure of the final regression model.  Third, it discusses 
the results of the probit regression modeling the probability that a firm has misrepresented its 
financial statement.  Fourth, it analyzes the results of the probit model as a classificatory tool 
that ordinary investors could use to discriminate risky fraud firms from less risky non-fraud 
firms. 
 
Data Description 
 Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics of the independent variables for both the 
fraud firms and the non-fraud firms.  Because of extreme values, the sample is winsorized to 
minimize their effect thereby obtaining more robust computation of the statistics.  Researchers 
popularly use winsorization to substitute extreme values with less extreme values and it is used 
in the current study for the same reason.  The extreme observations are trimmed by setting 
them to equal the limit, thereby reducing their weight without removing them from the 
sample.  The limit, in the current study, is set equal to the mean plus (minus) three standard 
deviations (Summers & Sweeney, 1998).  Winsorization is especially useful in a small sample, 
where extreme values may mask the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable.  The results of the winsorized data are reported in Tables 6 to 11, and 
those of the non-winsorized data are located in Appendix A.  
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Table 6 
Descriptive and Comparative Statistics for the Fraud and the Non-fraud Firms Using 
Winsorized Data 
Fraud Firms Non-Fraud Firms
N = 30 N = 30             Test of
   Differences in
Construct Predicted Standard Standard Mean Mean Median 
Acronym Sign Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median Difference p-value p-value
TAcc + -0.040 0.112 -0.047 -0.052 0.058 -0.056 0.013 0.295 0.384
daeAcc + 0.015 0.102 0.010 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.016 0.237 0.197
ESm1 - 1.314 1.147 0.932 1.245 1.182 0.823 0.069 0.410 0.348
ESm2 - -0.609 0.302 -0.697 -0.517 0.600 -0.837 -0.092 0.229 0.163
CPIT - 0.365 0.445 0.327 0.325 0.315 0.328 0.040 0.344 0.370
Free-C - 0.036 0.146 0.044 0.003 0.188 0.066 0.033 0.227 0.427
DSRI + 1.038 0.207 1.013 1.012 0.123 1.030 0.026 0.279 0.415
INV + 0.025 0.187 0.015 0.006 0.112 -0.010 0.019 0.316 0.027
SGI + 1.178 0.233 1.099 1.146 0.159 1.115 0.032 0.267 0.459
AQI + 0.029 0.067 0.018 0.004 0.055 0.008 0.025 0.059 0.061
LEV + 1.135 0.279 1.039 1.056 0.186 1.032 0.079 0.101 0.253
Note: t-tests are used to assess differences in the means and Wilcoxon W test are used to assess differences in the medians. 
pvalue= one-tailed.  See Table 5 for the definitions of the construct acronyms. 
 
The reported p-value is one-tailed because the direction of the difference between the 
groups is predicted.  As shown in Table 6, the change variables AQI (mean=0.059; 
median=0.061) and LEV (mean=0.101; median=0.253) show significant differences between 
the fraud firms and the non-fraud firms.  The result is consistent with the findings of Beneish 
(1997, 1999).  This suggests that these change variables may be used as probable early warning 
signals of fraud.  For the change variable INV, the median (0.027) is significant but the mean 
(=0.316) is insignificant.  AQI and LEV may provide some economic benefit to investors, but 
contrary to prior earnings management research the remainder of the variables are inferentially 
similar.   
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Correlation Matrix 
 Table 7 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables of the combined 
sample.  The table shows the variables that are co-linear and may be excluded from the final 
regression model.  As expected, the matrix reveals correlation among many of the variables at 
the p<.05 significance level.  The variables TAcc, daeAcc, and CPIT are designed to proxy for 
accruals.  Most of the variables are correlated with TAcc and daeAcc.  For example, TAcc is 
highly and significantly correlated with daeAcc (.919) suggesting that both variables have the 
same influence on the dependent variable and will be insubstantial in the same model.  TAcc 
is, however, somewhat less strongly correlated with CPIT (.311) and the change variables SGI 
(.346) and AQI (.348).  There is a negative correlation between TAcc, ESm1 (-.353), and Free-
C (-.323).  The only variables that do not correlate with TAcc are ESm2 and the change 
variables DSRI, INV, and LEV.   
 
Except for ESm1, the same variables that are correlated with TAcc are also correlated 
with daeAcc.  The matrix also shows intercorrelations among some of the variables.  This 
means that they may not be combined in the final model because they are proxying for the 
same construct.  As they are measuring the same phenomenon, these variables may not help in 
discriminating between the fraud firms and the non-fraud firms.  
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Table 7 
Pearson Correlation for the Fraud and Non-fraud Samples Using Winsorized Data 
TAcc DaeAcc ESm1 ESm2 CPIT Free-C DSRI INV SGI AQI LEV
TAcc 1
daeAcc .919(**) 1
ESm1 -.353(**) -0.196 1
ESm2 -0.169 -0.148 .406(**) 1
CPIT .311(*) .381(**) 0.041 -0.080 1
Free-C -.323(*) -.268(*) -0.081 -.281(*) 0.073 1
DSRI 0.230 0.191 -0.118 -0.096 .305(*) -0.112 1
INV -0.221 -0.206 0.164 0.127 -0.173 0.026 0.135 1
SGI .346(**) .391(**) 0.035 -0.147 -0.051 -0.100 0.090 0.026 1
AQI .348(**) .362(**) -0.013 -0.117 -0.002 -0.115 -0.068 -0.031 -0.241 1
LEV 0.004 -0.119 -0.108 -0.111 -0.211 -0.229 -0.039 -0.195 0.209 0.1 1
Construct Acronym
 
Note:  * and **correlation is significant, p=0.05 and 0.01 respectively. See the definitions of the construct acronyms in Table 5. 
 
Selecting the Final Regression Model 
Backward-stepwise Elimination Procedure 
In searching for a good-fit submodel for the data, the probit backward-stepwise 
procedure is used in order to refine the selection of variables that strongly influence the 
dependent variable.  This procedure is possible because the computer has an algorithm that 
works to figure out what combination of variables will give the highest probability of not 
rejecting the null when it is true.  Of the several submodels estimated by this procedure, Step 6 
(appendix B) contained the criteria for the best-fitting model and it was used to test the probit 
regression.  This model contains five variables: daeAcc, Free-C, INV, AQI, and LEV.  It meets 
the selection criteria that (1) the estimated coefficient for each variable is significant, and (2) 
the model’s predictive accuracy is improved as a result of including the variable.  This 
approach focuses on the explanatory power of the variables and it helps to reduce the effects 
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of multicollinearity.  Table 8 reports the results of the model and the results of the backward-
stepwise regression are located in Appendix B.  
 
Variables Eliminated 
The ineffective variables are dropped from the model.  Of the three accrual proxies, 
daeAcc is the most effective predictor of financial fraud, and it is consistent with the findings 
of Lee et al.  TAcc and CPIT are less effective and they proxy the same construct as daeAcc.  
ESm1 and ESm2 are correlated with total accruals and their impact indicates that the fraud 
firms are not using fraudulent activities to smoothing earnings.   
 
Of the change variables, only two variables DSRI and SGI, are eliminated.  The 
insignificant result of DSRI is disappointing because revenue inflation is a popular citation for 
restatement in the media and academic literature.  Not surprisingly, the results of SGI also 
differ from those of Beneish (1997, 1999).  The disparity between the results of Beneish (1997, 
1999) and those of the current study is probably due to the difference in misstatement periods.  
While Beneish used the first year prior to misstatement and the first misstatement year, the 
first three years prior to public disclosure of the fraud is used in the current study.  The impact 
from differences in the samples is another factor in that the sample of Beneish (1997, 1999) 
contained a large number of start-up firms while the current study sampled only mature firms.  
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Probit Regression Results 
This section reports the probit regression results (Table 8).  Although logistic 
regression is also performed, its results are not reported in the current study because they are 
similar to the results reported in the probit regression.  The analysis reports a probit model 
with marginally statistically significant results (p=0.073) that support the hypothesis in the 
alternative form.  The model consists of a single accrual proxy, daeAcc and the variables Free-
C, AQI, and LEV.  This model provides evidence concerning the usefulness of Lee et al. 
daeAcc vis-à-vis other accrual proxies in detecting earnings management.  The dichotomous 
dependent variable (which measures the actual probability of fraud) of the probit model is that 
a firm is either a fraud firm or a non-fraud firm.  In the probit regression, the independent 
variables are assigned a value of one for the fraud-discovered firms and zero otherwise.   
 
The Probit Model 
 This section reports the result of the probit model with daeAcc as the single measure 
of accruals (Table 8).  The model is represented as follows: 
Dependent Variablei12  = βo + β1daeAcci + β2Free-Ci + β3INVi + β4AQIi + β5LEVi + εi or  
 
Fraud=1.990 + 5.219(daeAcc) + 1.513(Free-C) + 1.785(INV) + 6.041(AQI) + 1.645(LEV) +εi 
 
 
This parsimonious model appears to capture the maximum information about 
financial statement misrepresentation, and it is potentially likely to benefit investors in their 
investment decision-making.  The overall goodness-of-fit of the model as measured by the log 
 
12 Investors wishing to convert the predicted probit into probability values may do so in Excel using the following formula: 
NORMSDIST(βo + β1daeAcci +β2Free-Ci + β3INVi + β4AQIi + β5LEVi) 
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likelihood chi-square statistic is 10.078, and it is significant at p=0.073, rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients for all the independent variables are all zero.  The model’s 
psuedo-R2 is 21%.  Unlike OLS models which have real R2, in logistic and probit regression 
models, the Pseudo R2 is a descriptive measure of fit.  There is no exact analog of the R2 of 
OLS regression for models such as probit and logit that use maximum likelihood estimators.  
The reason is that in these models, the Psuedo R2 does not have a sampling distribution that 
allows it to be tested (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000).    
 
The interpretation of the estimated probit coefficient is in the metrics of the standard 
normal scoring (Z score).  It can be interpreted directly or converted to probabilities using the 
standard normal distribution table.  A high Z score implies higher probability of fraud and vice 
versa.  The sign of the coefficient indicates the direction of the effect.  The positive coefficient 
indicates that as the ratio increases, the probability of fraud increases while the other variables 
are held constant.  In the probit model, the coefficient of daeAcc is positive (5.219) and it is 
highly significant at p=0.018 (one tailed).  The interpretation of the estimated coefficient 
suggests that for the fraud firms, one unit increase in daeAcc results in a 5.219 increase along 
the “fraud” spectrum.  This result is consistent with the findings of Lee et al.  Throughout the 
backward-stepwise iterations, the change variables INV (p=0.073), AQI (p=0.031), and LEV 
(p=0.030) show significant differences between the fraud firms and the non-fraud firms, 
indicating their usefulness as early detectors of fraud.  For the fraud firms, these differences 
suggest that a unit increase in INV increases the probability of fraud as shown by the positive 
coefficient (1.785).  The indication is that fraud may be associated with a high ratio of 
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inventory relative to sales from one period to the next or with large and growing amounts of 
inventory that is out-of balance with sales.  Similarly, for every unit increase in AQI, the 
probability of fraud increases.   This means that firms engaged in income manipulation are 
more likely to capitalize normal expenses in this setting than those that are not.  Also, the 
positive coefficients suggest that as LEV increases the propensity to violate GAAP increases 
with high debt ratio.  Free-C (p=0.098) has an unexpectedly positive coefficient.  This result is 
surprising and inexplicable.  Perhaps the inclusion of components such as principal 
repayments on debt should have been incorporated into the calculation of this measure as 
firms need cash to cover principal that becomes due for payment.   
 
Table 8 
Probit Regression Results Using Winsorized Data 
                    
             The Probit Model  
Construct Predicted 
Acronym Sign Coefficient P-value
Intercept n/a -1.990 0.043*
daeAcc + 5.219 0.018
Free-C - 1.513 0.098
INV + 1.785 0.073
AQI + 6.041 0.031
LEV + 1.645 0.030
Log Likelihood 73.101
X 2 Statistic 10.078
p-value 0.073*
Pseudo-R2 21%  
                           Note: *p-value = two-tailed test.   See Table 5 for the definitions of the construct acronyms  
 
 
 
Financial Statement Misrepresentation:  Could Investors Detect It? 
 
 59 
Classification Result of the Model 
This section reports the classification result and the classification accuracy of the 
model (Table 9).  The number of observations that are correctly classified as fraud and non-
fraud are reported in the “Number Classified Correctly” column of the table.  The 
corresponding number of fraud firms misclassified as non-fraud firms and the number of non-
fraud firms misclassified as fraud firms are reported in the “Number Classified Incorrect” 
column.  The corresponding number correctly classified as fraud firms vis-à-vis non-fraud 
firms is reported in the “Percentage Classified Correctly” column.   The purpose of the model 
is to provide a framework for rational-investment decision making in a market of imperfect 
information.  The model uses the probabilities derived from the computed value of the probit 
regression reported in Table 8 to segregate the fraud firms from the non-fraud firms.  Table 9 
shows two results.  First, at a cutoff value of 0.5, the model correctly classifies 67% of the total 
firms in the population.  The firms with predicted probability above 0.5 are classified as fraud 
firms and those below 0.5 are classified as non-fraud firms.  Although a cutoff value of 0.5 is a 
popular threshold in this type of research, this threshold is arbitrary and not necessarily ideal as 
is the case in the current study, where an investor’s decision is based on a pairwise comparison.  
Pairwise, that is comparing a fraud firm to its matched non-fraud firm, the model correctly 
classifies 80% of the fraud firms in the population.  Pairwise uses the converted Z score or the 
predicted probability to rate the firms.  Since a high Z score means a higher probability of 
fraud, an investor, who is comparing two firms from the same industry, may use the lower 
probability score of the model and improve the chances of avoiding a fraud firm by at least 
30%.  On the other hand, an investor who relies on simple heuristics has only a 50-50 chance 
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of distinguishing a fraud firm from a non-fraud firm.  While this is a simple rule of thumb it 
controls for industry difference in ratios and the variables included in the model are frequently 
used as indicators of financial performance.  The predictive accuracy of the model is 
subsequently assessed on a validation sample, and it is described below in the “Validation 
Sample Result” section. 
 
Table 9 
Probit Model Actual Classification Result Using Winsorized Data 
Total Number Number Percentage Percentage                Fraud 
Number Classified Classified Classified Classified                Pairwise
of Firms Correctly Incorrectly Correctly Incorrectly % Correct % Incorrect
Fraud 30 18 12 60 40 80% 20%
Non-fraud 30 22 8 73 27
Total 60 40 20 67 33
 
  
Estimation and Validation Sample Results 
This section reports the sensitivity of estimated coefficients to the estimation sample 
and the ability of the model to correctly classify firms in the holdout sample.  To test for 
robustness across different samples, the estimation model is rerun 10 times with 10 random 
samples of 20 fraud firms and their matched-non-fraud firms (a total of 40 firms) using 
random numbers generated in Excel.  Likewise, the holdout sample with 10 fraud firms and 
their matched-non-fraud firms (a total of 20 firms) is rerun 10 times simultaneously with the 
estimation sample.  The holdout sample is discussed in more detail in the next section under 
“Validation Sample Result.”  
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Estimation Sample Result 
 Table 10 reports the results of the descriptive statistics and sensitivity of the 
estimation sample.  The statistics reported in the table consist of the mean, standard deviation, 
and median of the estimated coefficient for each variable.  Although the results are robust, 
there are some variations in the magnitude of some of the estimated coefficient means and 
medians (daeAcc, mean=5.894; median=5.256).  The sensitivity of the results reported in the 
matrix indicates how often each coefficient is significant throughout the ten iterations and how 
often the predicted sign of each remains correct.  For example, the variable daeAcc is 
significant throughout 60% (p=0.05) of the iterations and its predicted sign is 100% correct in 
all the iterations.  Except, for Free-C, the predicted signs of the variables remain consistent 
throughout the iterations.  The statistical significance of the variables throughout the iterations, 
however, was much higher at the 10% significance level than at the 5% significance level.  
Despite the variations, the result supports the findings reported in Table 8 which demarcate 
between fraudulent and non-fraudulent financial reporting.  
 
Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics and Sensitivity of Results for the Estimation Sample 
Using Winsorized Data 
Significant at Significant Significant at
Construct Standard Predicted 10 Percent at 5 Percent 2.5 Percent
Acronym Mean Deviation Median Sign Level Level Level
Intercept -1.767 1.060 -1.499 n/a 40%* 20%* 10%*
daeAcc 5.894 2.603 5.256 100% 80% 60% 50%
INV 1.313 0.860 1.060 100% 30% 10% 0%
Free-C 1.555 0.432 1.557 0% 20% 0% 0%
AQI 6.735 2.532 6.458 100% 60% 60% 30%
LEV 1.443 0.973 1.155 100% 40% 30% 10%  
                 Note:  *indicates two-tailed test.    
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Validation Sample Result 
This section reports the classification results of the probit validation model (Table 11).  
The coefficient estimates in each of the estimation probit model are used to calculate the 
probability of fraud for the 20 holdout samples (10 matched-pairs) excluded from the 
estimation sample.  The estimated probabilities from the 20 holdout samples, consisting of 
both the fraud firms and the non-fraud firms, are used to test the model’s predictive ability.  
Table 11 reports two results.  First, at a cutoff value of 0.5, the model correctly classifies 62% 
of the total firms in the population.  Second, pairwise, the model correctly classifies 73% of the 
fraud firms in the population.  The model may decrease the probability of investing in a fraud 
firm to 27% from 50%. 
 
Table 11 
Probit Model Predicted Classification Result Using Winsorized Data 
Fraud Non-fraud 
N=10 N=10 Fraud 
          Percent Classified % Pairwise
Correctly Correctly Correct
<.5 >.5
Sample 1 60% 40% 60%
Sample 2 60% 50% 80%
Sample 3 80% 70% 60%
Sample 4 30% 70% 80%
Sample 5 60% 40% 70%
Sample 6 80% 60% 80%
Sample 7 40% 90% 80%
Sample 8 70% 80% 80%
Sample 9 50% 80% 70%
Sample 10 60% 70% 70%
Total 59% 65% 73%
Overall 62% 73%  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The current study examines the issue of whether by carefully analyzing financial 
reports and other publicly available information, investors could determine that firms are 
fraudulently reporting their financial position and performance.  A matched-pair design is used 
in the analysis to simulate the investment strategy of an individual investor, who is comparing 
two unknown firms from the same industry (and is unlikely to compare all firms in the 
industry).  The analysis reports a model that is marginally statistically significant at p=0.073.  
These results support the hypothesis in the alternative form that diligent investors could 
improve their chances of detecting fraudulent accounting by using fundamental financial 
statement analysis.  The model indicates that taken together, the variables daeAcc, Free-C, 
INV, AQI, and LEV provide an increased ability to separate fraud firms from non-fraud firms.  
The results indicate that daeAcc is consistent with the probability that the fraud firms may 
have used accruals to fraudulent manage earnings relative to the non-fraud firms.  The fraud 
firms demonstrate larger and growing amounts of inventory relative to sales than the non-
fraud firms. They also show higher probability of misclassifying normal expenses as indicated 
by changes in the asset quality index and higher debts than the non-fraud firms.  However, of 
the five variables, only AQI and LEV have independent discriminatory power.  As a 
classificatory tool, the model correctly classifies 73% of the observations.  This means that an 
investor, who is comparing two unknown firms from the same industry, may use the lower Z 
score of the model and improve the chances of avoiding a fraud firm by at least 23%.   
Financial Statement Misrepresentation:  Could Investors Detect It? 
 
 64 
This final model contains important information that may benefit ordinary investors in 
making investment decisions relating to fraud firms and non-fraud firms.  This model is 
potentially useful because if an investor uses it to make investment decision the market may 
function more efficiently.  Because this model has not correctly classified all fraud firms in the 
population, it means that some fraud firms may be able to hide their misconduct.  Investors 
should not entirely rely on the model but consider it in conjunction with other factors 
connected with fraud risk such as the work of Dechow et al. (1996) which indicates that 
governance issues are also important indicators of fraud.  Despite the exploratory nature of the 
current study and the fact that the results must be considered within its limitations, the 
financial ratios show that an individual investor, who uses this model may be able to uncover 
financial statement misrepresentation.  The findings of the current study provide justification 
for further investigation in order to ascertain whether a larger sample would provide a more 
robust model for detecting financial statement misrepresentation.  
 
Contributions 
This examination of the role and responsibility of investors in getting the truth of 
corporate earnings would help to fill some of the gaps in the relevant literature.  Although the 
study is based on a small sample, it has produced results that are consistent with those of Lee 
et al. and Beneish (1997, 1999), who used much larger samples.  The matched-pair design is 
fairly informative and may have been more effective over a larger sample.  The results of the 
current study provide new insights into the understanding of the problem of abusive earnings 
management.  Since the result is not unequivocally conclusive, it provides justification for 
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further investigation in order to ascertain whether a larger sample would provide a more 
robust model for detecting financial statement misrepresentation.  
 
Limitations of the Study 
As with any exploratory study, there are limitations with the current investigation. 
First, the study is restricted to a relatively small sample of fraud firms located in the U.S. only.  
Second, the study sampled only mature firms and firms whose fraudulent cases were publicly 
disclosed thereby making it difficult to determine their representativeness relative to all firms 
that may be involved in earnings manipulation.  Third, the probit model is restricted to a 
population that is split 50-50.  These constraints mean that the research results cannot be 
generalized back to the sample population.  
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Developing models that naïve investors could use to detect earnings management is 
inadequately researched.  Future research should focus on how to develop robust models for 
investors.  This investigation should attempt to expand the current study by selecting large 
samples of firms from multiple geographies.  This sort of sample could yield superior results. 
Future research on earnings management should also focus on the relative return that naïve 
investors could obtain from using a model than relying solely on analysts’ forecast.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table 6A 
Descriptive Statistics and Comparison of Means for the Fraud and 
Non-fraud Samples Using Non-winsorized Data 
N = 30 N = 30
Fraud Firms Non-fraud Firms
Construct Predicted Standard Standard Mean t-test Wilcox W
Acronym Sign Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median Difference p-value p-value
TAcc + -0.031 0.139 -0.047 -0.052 0.058 -0.056 0.021 0.449 0.779
daeAcc + 0.019 0.128 0.004 0.004 0.057 -0.002 0.015 0.566 0.813
ESm1 - 1.319 1.164 0.932 1.254 1.209 0.823 0.066 0.831 0.701
ESm2 - -0.609 0.302 -0.697 -0.513 0.611 -0.837 -0.096 0.443 0.322
CPIT - 0.454 0.900 0.327 0.325 0.315 0.328 0.129 0.462 0.745
Free-C - 0.036 0.146 0.044 0.001 0.193 0.066 0.035 0.437 0.859
DSRI + 1.046 0.232 1.013 1.012 0.123 1.030 0.034 0.479 0.836
INV + 0.037 0.226 0.015 0.006 0.112 -0.010 0.030 0.511 0.052
SGI + 1.190 0.270 1.099 1.146 0.159 1.115 0.044 0.441 0.906
AQI + 0.027 0.073 0.017 0.003 0.059 0.007 0.025 0.157 0.121
LEV + 1.153 0.341 1.039 1.056 0.186 1.032 0.097 0.176 0.506
Note: t-tests are used to assess differences in the means and Wilcoxon W test are used to assess differences in the medians. p-
value= one-tailed.  See Table 5 for the definitions of the construct acronyms.   
 
 
Table 7A 
Spearman Rho Correlation Matrix for the Combined Fraud and Non-fraud Sample 
Using Non-winsorized Data 
Construct Acronym
TAcc daeAcc ESm1 ESm2 CPIT Free-C DSRI INV SGI AQI LEV
TAcc 1
daeAcc .903(**) 1
ESm1 -.428(**) -.310(*) 1
ESm2 -0.224 -0.112 .601(**) 1
CPIT 0.164 0.169 -0.051 -0.17 1
Free-C -.348(**) -.361(**) -0.067 -0.062 .272(*) 1
DSRI 0.184 0.108 -0.089 -0.171 0.182 -0.121 1
INV 0.062 0.043 0.052 0.149 0.079 -0.114 0.117 1
SGI .364(**) .408(**) -0.047 -0.071 0.003 -0.079 0.155 -0.195 1
AQI -0.162 -0.116 0.084 .272(*) 0.004 0.155 0.115 0.054 0.132 1
LEV 0.032 -0.025 0.046 -0.018 -0.241 0.237 -0.120 -0.11 .282(*) .294(*) 1
Note:  * and **correlation is significant at the p = 0.05 and p = 0.01 (2-tailed) respectively. 
    See Table 5 for the definitions of the constructs and their acronyms.   
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